INTL647 American Military Differences between CNA CND and CNE Paper In a minimum of 600 words, address the the differences between Cyber Network Defense, Cyber Network Exploitation and Cyber Network Attack. Additionally, address how the history of the cyber effort and cyber war impact U.S. security and national intelligence.
References:
Demchak, Chris C. Studies in Security and International Affairs: Wars of Disruption and Resilience: Cybered Conflict, Power, and National Security. Athens, GA; The University of Georgia Press, 2011. (Chapter 1).
Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), “Cyber Intelligence: Setting the Landscape For An Emerging Discipline,” INSA (2011).
Masters, Jonathan, “Confronting the Cyber Threat,” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-policy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577.
Reveron, Derek S. Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World, Edited by Derek S. Reverson. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. (Chapter 1).
U.S. Government. Government Accountability Office (GAO). A Briefing for the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (July 29, 2011).
U.S. Government. Government Accountability Office (GAO). High Risk Series: Urgent Actions Are Needed to Address Cybersecurity Challenges Facing the Nation, GAO-18-645T. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 25, 2018.
Warner, Michael. “Cybersecurity: A Pre-History,” Intelligence and National Security 27, No.5 (2012): 781-789.
Zegart, Amy B. “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies,” International Security 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 78–111. CH AP TER O N E
Globalization and Spread
of Cybered Conflict
Copyright © 2011. University of Georgia Press. All rights reserved.
C
yberspace enables cooperation and conflict in nearly equal measure. In
today’s open, near-free, digitally enabled globalization, new and old enemies from unempowered individuals to national-level leaders can use easy
access to international systems to engage in conflict, or economics, or both.
Barriers to entry have particularly fallen for bad actors seeking to exploit distant populations using cyberspace connections. Each set of actors today at
their own chosen scale of organization can reach far, deep, and wide into
other nations at little near-term physical cost or physical risk to themselves.
At their whim, distant or hidden bad actors can also use cyberspace to add to
others’ attacks for whatever reason or impulse. They may choose to opportunistically worsen natural disasters, expanding or redirecting disruptive cascading outcomes that disable key functions of whole societies, communities, or
opposing military forces. In this world of global digital access, without great
wealth, land, authority, or comrades in arms, opponents can easily attempt to
harm in one big attack or many smaller attacks that can cumulate over time
to even more destruction in tightly coupled modern systems. The intended
victims may not even know their attackers, who can emerge from seemingly
nowhere, whether inside or outside national borders. This new international
reality creates the complexity of national security today and the need for a
book reframing security strategy for modern democracies enmeshed in globally enabled cybered conflicts.
The power of a modern state to reduce the harm of obscure unknown
attackers lies in its ability to recognize emerging sources of surprise and to
disrupt or accommodate them. Conflict between human societies has always
been about successfully disrupting the opponent, whether that opponent was
a raiding party, an army, a city, or a whole nation, to get some desired out-
Demchak, Chris C.. Wars of Disruption and Resilience : Cybered Conflict, Power, and National Security,
University of Georgia Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=3039013.
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[2]
chapter one
come. As structured social groups began to desire outcomes that could not be
achieved without disrupting other similarly sized opponents, organized conflict emerged as a way to be successful in proportion to the need for disruption.
War emerged as a violent conflict between armed organizations, the outcome
of which was significant for the successful functioning of opposing societies
(O’Connell 1989). Since people get up and get well after being hit and may
not stop what they are doing if the object of contest is critical enough, the
most readily chosen form of disruption became killing, especially of those who
could get up to fight again.
Today conflict is more likely to occur in its older, more basic sense: disrupting an opponent to achieve an outcome while ensuring that the opponent cannot succeed in disrupting one’s home social group. The difference between
most of human history and today is that open global cyberspace has enabled
would-be hidden, distant, or smallscale opponents to attempt societal disruption that historically only close neighbors or superpowers could consider. Harnessed to traditional notions of national security, modern democracies struggle
to understand the complex critical systems they constructed for economic
prosperity. These now enable nonstate as well as state actors to impose harm
across the globe seemingly at will. As currently constructed, cyberspace offers
malevolent actors anywhere with internet access three extraordinary advantages in conflict: such actors can easily choose the scale of their organization,
the proximity of their targets, and the precision of their attack plans. In other
words, initially unknown, distant, or hidden actors in, say, Ghana can use the
global web to organize from five to five hundred compatriots, to attack from
five to five thousand kilometers away, and to target from five to five million
people in one or many democratic nations simultaneously.1
When globally enabled by open, near-free cyberspace, conflict becomes
vastly more complex and surprising. Today what has been seen as the power of
nations to defend themselves is in transition. The historically and conceptually
easiest response to attackers was destruction, but as a strategy, such destruction is difficult, if not impossible, for organized modern democratic nations
to exert effectively when those who might get up to fight again hide among
1. If one were to put these attributes in more concrete military operational terms, cyberspace offers an attacking force five characteristics: reach, free fire at will, mass targets, easy
stealth, and near instantaneous high-capacity payload.
Demchak, Chris C.. Wars of Disruption and Resilience : Cybered Conflict, Power, and National Security,
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Globalization and Cybered Conflict [3]
innocent civilians across the world under another nation’s rule of law. The
modern international system is consensually characterized by an assumption
that borders are immutable and that complete annihilation of an entire social
group, let alone a country, is not acceptable. Today modern democracies act
more like the democratic city-states: even if one wins a destructive war, the
winning forces withdraw to let the defeated state recover as an independent
country. Destruction does not produce many tangible gains.
Furthermore, the first cyberspace-enabled attack may be so successful that
even if one could physically destroy the perpetrators after the fact, the violent
ripples across key systems in the defending social systems could take years
to mitigate, recover, and innovate beyond. Destruction in response may be
attempted, but the returns would not in any way compensate for the initial
disruptive losses. Under such circumstances, the ability of the defending social
group to march armies to the border to stop a neighbor or face down a superpower would be a simply inadequate and tardy strategic response.
Today a nation’s “power” rests on its capacities to meet the wide range of
cybered conflicts, both disrupting in advance and being resilient to systemic
surprise imposed by hidden, distant, and difficult to identify enemies, whether
they are state or nonstate actors. This strategic combination of disruption and
resilience capacities constitutes the cyber power of a modern democratic state.
At its most elemental construction, the modern digitized nation-state must be
able to disrupt attackers in advance or during the attack in progress before
key systems in the home society are disabled in any significant way. Both capacities—reaching out to disrupt and reaching in to ensure resilience—are
critical to national power in a world of cybered conflict. Modern nations can
no longer sit behind their borders, treaties, alliances, or militaries.
The cybered age taking shape in front of us requires a new framework for
national security, one of security resilience.2 Based on a syncretic approach
to international theories and to theories of complexity and surprise, such a
strategy aims to balance appropriately the national institutional capacities for
2. As of this writing, I can find no other scholarly use of the term security resilience. I
note, however, that a document published in advance of the spring election in the United
Kingdom comes very close. See “A Resilient Nation: National Security Green Paper,” 2009,
http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Green%20Papers/National_Security_Green_
Paper.ashx?dl=true.
Demchak, Chris C.. Wars of Disruption and Resilience : Cybered Conflict, Power, and National Security,
University of Georgia Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=3039013.
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[4]
chapter one
disruption of would-be attackers while simultaneously ensuring societal resilience to potentially cascading and disabling surprises in critical national
systems.
For the modern digitized democracies viewed as today’s large city-states, the
global, nearly free, deeply intruding access of cyberspace extends the number,
scale, reach, and abilities of potential enemies far beyond history’s usual set
of suspects comprising neighbors, roving bandits, and the occasional expanding empire. The nature of “war” moves from societally threatening one-off
clashes of violence between close neighbors to a global version of long-term,
episodically and catastrophically dangerous, chronic insecurities that involve
the whole society. In cybered conflict across a digitally open international
system, traditional strategic buffers of distance or declared borders do not stop
societally critical attacks. The modern equivalents of ancient city-states face
the dilemmas of their predecessors: how to disrupt an attacker that one usually
cannot destroy as well as ensure the attack itself does not disrupt the city’s
systems critically. Now, as then, society’s security depends on how well the
community institutionalizes its security strategy with knowledge, consensus,
skills, and design. In the post–Cold War era, national security depends on the
dynamic and responsive weighting of disruption and resilience integrated into
a strategy for the inevitably long term in a chronic war against each emerging
surprise attacker or attack from anywhere in the cybered world.
At the end of the day, the central normative concern is with averting violent
harm as a consequence of conflict that is critically enabled by cybered tools.
Because cyberspace is global, nearly free, and easy to use, the Cold War notions of reaching out to destroy an attacker are too narrow, and resilience needs
to be an essential part of disruption. The tools of harm will come from surprising sources, including those previously considered only domestic concerns
such as cyber stealing from wealthier westerners. As an occupation, cyber
stealing seems not much of a national-level threat, but the global community
engaged in this kind of anonymous activity also develops the tools for other
bad actors much more focused on violent harm. While democratic nations
may seek only to disrupt attackers or their attacks, violent harm is the primus
inter pares goal of those hostile to westernized nations. With sufficiently stoked
grievances among the surging youth populations of dysfunctional regions, attacks to achieve this violence will inevitably impose surprise in cybered ways
for the next generation at least.
Demchak, Chris C.. Wars of Disruption and Resilience : Cybered Conflict, Power, and National Security,
University of Georgia Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=3039013.
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Globalization and Cybered Conflict [5]
Copyright © 2011. University of Georgia Press. All rights reserved.
E M ERG I N G U N CIVIL C YBERED I N TER N ATI O N A L SYS TE M
Before the complexities of globalization began to change the international
environment, the strategic borders of rivers, mountains, seas, walls, or armed
guards clarified friend from foe. With the emergence of the modern state,
nationally threatening enemies did not emanate from both outside and inside
the society simultaneously (Tilly 1992). National security missions could be
clearly allocated to either domestic or international arenas, specialized and
constrained accordingly. In the bipolar Cold War era, that clarity solidified
and routinized with only two significant superpower players in global conflicts. Nations singly or allied in blocs were focused on the threats from one
or the other major player. Security communities across the westernized world
focused on narrow questions such as launch times and counterattack nuclear
payload, geographic distances to move through and occupy in rebuffing a military challenge, and peculiarities of a relatively small number of personalities in
security-related international or domestic politics (Sagan and Waltz 1995; E. A.
Cohen 2004). In many respects due to the clarity of the enemies, the Cold War
era’s major security dilemmas were defined more like the set-piece division of
threats of western Europe in the 1700s. Institutions grew up focused on either
national security threats or domestic concerns regarding social well-being, order, organized criminality, or societal service functions (Strachan 1983).
Technologies and the security of the social order of societies are deeply intertwined and interactive. During the 1800s, across Europe’s borders, that era’s
modernization waves roiled societies burdened with the excess farm population. By the late 1840s, Europe saw violent uprisings in most of its capitals
(Sperber 2005). Similarly, the Cold War’s technological advances and prosperity inconspicuously developed the elements of today’s declining ability to
secure borders. Its legacies in globally linked dependencies and small lethal
packages of lethal weapons continue to arm enemies or friends, to open or
close vulnerabilities, and to stimulate or dampen concerns about security
(O’Connell 1989). Individuals, groups, or communities recognizing threats
inevitably find ways to use new technologies in their security strategy, even if
the solution is a new type of boat by which to run away or a long hunting bow
redirected to attack other humans.
The cybered world has challenged the broad but neat internal and external distinctions of security cemented in the bipolar era. Modern actors have
Demchak, Chris C.. Wars of Disruption and Resilience : Cybered Conflict, Power, and National Security,
University of Georgia Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=3039013.
Created from apus on 2019-07-01 09:06:22.
Copyright © 2011. University of Georgia Press. All rights reserved.
[6]
chapter one
discovered how to integrate the exceptionally fast and readily available global
communications networks in their plans for conflict. Widely connected, unconstrained, and easily accessed global systems routinely undermine three
historically critical dampeners on hostilities—long geographical distances,
difficulties in organizing and controlling large enough groups of people, and
poor knowledge of the target—in order to be sure to attack effectively. Attacks
in history, by contrast, were more likely to be local or littoral, where at least
knowledge of the target was easier to obtain. Attack organizations were likely
to be small and local or very large and controlled by a state-level equivalent
leader or oligarchy. Operations were either raids or campaigns big enough to
survive the multitude of surprises from what was unknown, unorganized, or
too far to reach (O’Connell 1989). These obstacles historically constrained
conflict to being local or between state-level entities.
When globalized communications relax the three dampeners on scale,
proximity, and precision, offense at a distance is made easier for those with
more-limited resources. A digitized community like a modern nation-state is
especially more vulnerable to new attackers from distant poorer and semigoverned rogue states, failing cities, or turbulent hinterlands. The advanced civil
societies are deeply embedded in global nets. In contrast, the homelands of the
potential new attackers may be internally violent, corrupt, or exploitative, but
they are also markedly less digitized. The societies of the dysfunctional regions
of the world are less easy or productive cyber targets.
The result is a marked divide in security concerns now emerging between
two broad communities of the globally cybered world that do not share the
same expectations in acceptable individual and collective behaviors, civil governance, normal societal security, and mechanisms of resource allocations.
Including not only the westernized nations but also rapidly developing democracies such as India, the first group acts collectively and individually more
like history’s city-states. While competing strongly economically, they do not
engage in violent existential conflict with each other.3 They share a roughly
convergent collective notion of security, which includes stability, rule of law,
honesty, transparency, and importantly, a strong dislike for violent behavior,
whether by individuals or states. In contrast, the other group of semigovernable
3. It is possible that the U.S.-China relationship could emerge more violently as the
conflict between two large city-states contesting regional dominance. The likelihood is low,
but higher than any chance of such conflict between other westernized nations.
Demchak, Chris C.. Wars of Disruption and Resilience : Cybered Conflict, Power, and National Security,
University of Georgia Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=3039013.
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Globalization and Cybered Conflict [7]
regions, societies, or darker areas of cyberspace are frequently demographically
unstable, politically barely coherent, and poorly productive economically. Collectively termed the “badlands” merely as a shorthand in this book, these areas
tend to be internally corrupt, secretive, brutal, and accepting of higher levels
of violent behavior as normal though regrettable. This group acts often as a
spoiler both in its own internal operations and in the wider international system, becoming a source of global turbulence and of a large volume of mobile
bad actors sharing few of the social constraints of the more-digitized nations.
Between the two groups, huge digitally enabled flows of information, people,
goods, and resources transfer enormous economic benefits but also misperceptions, weapons, targeting data, and reasons for hostility and resentment.
There are large demographic and wealth imbalances between the two groups,
and not yet fully understood are possibilities for waves of social turbulence
likely to come in the not far future. The 2011 upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia
are likely to be foretastes of future instabilities from these more-dysfunctional
areas. Too many young males in unstable, semigoverned developing societies
perceive little hope for a better life. Global transport systems and cyberspace
give these likely aggrieved young populations unprecedented access physically
or digitally to the more organized, open, wealthy, civil centers of the world. For
example, key experts on global radical Islam have argued its newest expression,
the leaderless cell jihad often led by career jihadists in and out of prison and
orchestrated by cybered methods, will be around at a minimum for the next
twenty years (Pluchinsky 2008).
The widespread availability of cyberspace makes it all too possible in densely
populated poorer areas to “farm” deprivation or cultural aversion grievances,
whether led by a local group, a national leader, or the cadre of an international
cult or movement. Because of the low costs of reaching large numbers of
people online, appeals that would have died out in prior generations today survive and sometimes even revive. Through the graphics and av…
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