answer the questions below. Please make sure your responses are comprehensive and reflect a high level of integration of the course readings and textual material.
Since this is an open-book, open-notes exam, you are free to consult outside sources as you formulate your response. Feel free, even, to incorporate some of the research you have utilized in your papers as well as material we have posted at our Facebook page. But whenever you use any sources, be sure to give appropriate citations. By now I know you all understand the consequences associated with failure to give appropriate credit for the works/ideas of others.
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Please email your responses within 24 hours as a Word attachment to.
Good Luck!
The Case:
As a result of activities within the Abu-Ghraib prison, Donald Rumsfeld faced circumstances that were arguably as grave as any leader will ever encounter. The result of his actions, both in his oversight as Secretary of Defense and the ensuing allegations of abuse revealed in the media, have serious implications for the reputation and security of the United States, and for the view of citizens towards their government. Please answer the following (either separately or integrated into one essay):
1. What were the principal factors that led to the abuse at Abu-Ghraib prison?
2. What were the major ethical and leadership concerns raised in this case and how well did Rumsfeld and others in Department of Defense chain of command handle them?
3. Use the Triadic Model presented by Bowman and West to analyze this case. For example, how might someone utilize a utilitarian perspective to perceive the events in this case and justify some of the decisions made by the leadership hierarchy within the Department of Defense? How might this analysis be altered if one employed a deontological framework and/or virtue theory?
4. Now that we have had a chance to look back at this fiasco, what specific strategies would you propose to ensure this never happens again? What changes would you make to prison operations? What changes would you suggest in terms of both policies and decision making processes?
The Case:
Case Teaching Resources FROM TH E E V A N S S C H O O L O F P U B L I C A F F A I R S
DONALD RUMSFELD AND PRISONER ABUSE AT ABU GHRAIB
Facing the Senate Armed Services Committees on May 7, 2004, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld responded to the question of whether he would resign over the recently
exposed prisoner abuse allegations in Iraq: “Needless to say, if I felt I could not be
effective, I’d resign in a minute. I would not resign simply because people are trying to
make a political issue out of it” (1). A political issue it would inevitably become, as a scant
six months remained before the presidential election. The war in Iraq already proved to
be a central theme, and a polarized electorate threatened to magnify the political
implications. Haunting images of torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib, the prison once
notorious for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s cruelty to his own people, were first
released during the airing of CBS’s Sixty Minutes II, on April 28, 2004. Soldiers had
gathered and shared these pictures on discs, via e-mail, and even used them as screen
savers on computers within interrogation rooms. The images depicted naked prisoners
forced into sexual positions, crawling on the floor, handcuffed to other naked prisoners,
or standing with their arms secured above their heads for hours or days on end. The
images further revealed soldiers threatening naked prisoners with military dogs and
prisoners wearing hoods—their genitals attached to electric wires. Some were bruised,
slashed, and even shot to death. The pictures—utterly graphic, shocking, and
undeniable—evoked visceral reactions around the world.
President Bush and members of Congress claimed they were not briefed about the
problems or allegations before CBS released pictures to television audiences, news
organizations, and internet viewers worldwide. As events continued to unfold in the
news, questions about the training and supervision of the prison guards emerged. From
Senate hearings and call-in radio shows, American allies and Arab populations, a volley
of voices demanded answers. Who should be held accountable for the guards’ actions?
Were they instructed to abide by the Geneva Conventions? Why were they taking
pictures? What indication did they have from superiors that this was appropriate
behavior? What implications would the revelations have for American support for the
war in Iraq, for the presidential election campaign, and perhaps more importantly, for
1 Donald Rumsfeld video clip, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript #050700CN.V22, p. 5, May 7, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
2
America’s image on a global scale? These questions prompted many commentators, such
as CNN’s Larry King to ask, “Does someone big have to go?” (2)
The Taguba Report
While top officials and politicians apparently remained unaware of events that would
soon unfold in a political crisis, military officials had already begun proceeding with
investigations. On January 19, 2004, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7)
Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo Sanchez, commander of U.S. military forces in Iraq,
requested that higher authorities at U.S. Central Command appoint an Investigating
Officer to “conduct an investigation into the allegations of detainee abuse at the Abu
Ghraib Prison, which was also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility” (3).
According to the New York Times, the investigation resulted from pictures and a report
submitted anonymously just six days earlier by Army Specialist Joseph Darby, a reservist
serving in the 372nd Military Police (MP) Company at Abu Ghraib (4).
The order to investigate from Central Command charged Major General Antonio Taguba
with investigating allegations of abuse, as well as directing him to inquire into
accountability lapses and escapes at the prison, general training and standards, internal
procedures and command policies within the 800th MP Brigade, in charge of the prison
system in Iraq. The report, completed in early March 2004, revealed a disturbing account
of leadership failure, and called into question how high the level of culpability would
rise.
MG Taguba’s report generally corroborated operational failures outlined in an earlier
report by Major General Donald Ryder, submitted November 5, 2003. As Commander of
the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, MG Ryder reported on prison
operations in Iraq. Although the two reports alleged similar operational problems, they
diverged on two important points. The Ryder Report indicated that no abuse or
mistreatment had taken place, and concluded that “military police were not asked to help
prepare prisoners for interrogations” as alleged in the later Taguba Report (5). MG
Taguba’s Report was leaked to the press in May 2004, and detailed the abuses only
recently revealed to the public as follows:
“That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement
Facility (BCCF) numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal
abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse of
detainees was perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force
(372md Military Police Company, 320th Military Police Battalion, 800th MP
Brigade…. The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness
2 Larry King, commentator, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript #050700CN.V22, p. 14, May 7, 2004
3 Major General Antonio Taguba, Testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, CNN Transcript
#051101CN.V54, p 13, May 11, 2004.
4 Kate Zernike, “Only a Few Spoke Up on Abuse As Many Soldiers Stayed Silent”, Section A Column 1,
May 22, 2004.
5 Ted Bridis, “Conflict Seen for General in Abuse Probe”, The Associated Press, June 2, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
3
statements (Annex 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic
evidence.”6
“I find that the intentional abuse of the detainees by military police personnel
included the following acts:
a. Punching, slapping and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;
b. Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
c. Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for
photographing;
d. Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several
days at a time;
e. Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s underwear;
f. Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being
photographed and videotaped;
g. Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;
h. Positioning a naked male detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head,
and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis, to simulate electric torture;
i. Writing “I am a Rapest” (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly
raped a 15-year-old fellow detainee; and then photographing him naked;
j. Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee’s neck and having a
female Soldier pose for a picture;
k. A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
l. Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten
detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;
m. Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees;”7
The Taguba Report also examined numerous escapes, riots, beatings, and shootings that
took place at Abu Ghraib. There were accounts of detainee-on-detainee fighting,
smuggled weapons within the prison, and prison guards forced to use, on occasion, lethal
force to retain control. The details in the report indicated a general sense of lawlessness
and chaos within the prison.
The Geneva Convention
According to the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the actions
of the United States in a sovereign nation such as Iraq, are bound by the Convention, as a
High Contracting Party to the agreement. The following articles outline these obligations:
Article 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
6 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, p. 16, March, 2004.
7 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, pp. 16-17,. March, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
4
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their
mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation
to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
Article 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples (8).
Conditions at Abu Ghraib
Military officials, and ultimately members of Congress, the public, and Secretary
Rumsfeld, concurred that the Geneva Convention was clearly violated on certain
occasions at Abu Ghraib. What was less clear were the circumstances that fostered this
type of treatment. MG Taguba’s report revealed a lack of leadership and operational
integrity under the command of Brigadier General (BG) Janis Karpinski, Commander of
the 800th Military Police Brigade. MG Taguba’s report revealed some disturbing
indications that this type of behavior was at best condoned, and at worst ordered, by top
military brass, officials in the Department of Defense or the Bush Administration. The
culture and operations of the prison would ultimately complicate the determination of
8 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
5
whether these actions were aberrant, unsupervised acts by a handful of soldiers, or
whether the responsibility lay much higher up the chain of command.
Following are excerpts from MG Taguba’s report (bold face original) (9):
Training
“I find that prior to its deployment in Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training in
detention/internee operations . I also find that very little instruction or training
was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-
19.40. Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were
ever made available to MP personnel or detainees” (10).
“Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee operations; however,
they have been unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in rosters, or
soldiers who can recall the content of this training” (11).
Standard Operating Procedures
“There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of basic
legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP
Brigade, and its subordinate units” (12).
“The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after in-processing was
inconsistent from detention facility to detention facility, compound to compound,
encampment to encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP
Brigade AOR” (13).
“Accountability and facility operations SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures)
lacked specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks and balances
to ensure compliance” (14).
9 Excerpts arranged in categories by the case author.
10 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, pp. 19-20. March, 2004.
11 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, pp. 26,. March, 2004.
12 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 22,. March, 2004.
13 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 23. March, 2004.
14 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 24. March, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
6
“The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely
held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without
accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their
detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib
called these detainees “ghost detainees.” On at least one occasion, the 320th MP
Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of “ghost detainees” (6-8) for OGAs that
they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive,
contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law” (15).
Prison Crowding
“The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca [a higher security, smaller prison located in
Baghdad] Detention Facilities are significantly over their intended maximum
capacity while the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This
imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and
accountability lapses at the various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities
also limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee population
who may be organizing escapes and riots within the facility” (15).
“The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should not be in custody
takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention
facilities. There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the theaterwide
internment operations. First, the apprehending unit can release a detainee if
there is a determination that their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly,
a criminal detainee can be released after it has been determined that the detainee
has no intelligence value, and that their release would not be detrimental to
society. BG Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in this second
category. Lastly, detainees accused of committing “Crimes Against the
Coalition,” who are held throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR can
be released upon a determination that they are of no intelligence value and no
longer pose a threat to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category of
detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a
Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA,
CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the “Detainee Release
Authority” for detainees being held for committing crimes against the coalition.
According to BG Karpinski, this category of detainee makes up more than 60% of
the total detainee population, and is the fastest growing category. However, MG
Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely denied the board’s recommendations
to release detainees in this category who were no longer deemed a threat and
clearly met the requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski, the
15 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 26 March, 2004
16 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 25, March, 2004
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
7
extremely slow and ineffective release process has significantly contributed to the
overcrowding of the facilities” (17).
Culture
“Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th Battalion TOC
contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which
highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There was no indication that the
journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of command” (18).
“Basic Army Doctrine was not widely reinforced or utilized to develop the
accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s subordinate units.
Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made up
as the as the operations developed with reliance on, and guidance from, junior
members of the unit who had civilian corrections experience” (19).
“In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI, etc…),
third country nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be properly
supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site
inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised free access in the
detainee area. Having civilians in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about
the detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to the difficulties in
the accountability process and with detecting escapes”(20).
Accountability
“There was a severe lapse of accountability of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison
Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a self-created “change sheet” to document
the transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For proper accountability,
it is imperative that these change sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be
updated in within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process would
often take as long as 4days to complete and resulted in inaccurate Internment
Serial Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee manifest and the
actual occupants of an individual compound, and significant confusion of the MP
soldiers…” (21).
17 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 25, March, 2004.
18 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 24, March, 2004.
19 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 24, March, 2004.
20 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 26, March, 2004.
21 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 23, March, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
8
”Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6
Investigations concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber stamped
as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that
the majority of her orders directing the implementation of substantive changes
were ever acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to
verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations
contained within their own investigations been analyzed and actually
implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability
lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented” (22).
Chain of Command
“SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in his sworn statement as
follows, “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, wing 1A, being made
to do various things I would question morally. In Wing 1A, we were told that
they had different rules, and different SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of
rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier In charge of 1A
was Corporal Granier. He stated that the agents and MI Soldiers would ask
him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he could complain. (sic)”
When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than the rest of the wings,
SGT Davis stated: “The rest of the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are
Military intelligence (MI) holds.” When asked why he did not inform his chain
commander about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: “Because I assumed that if they
were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone
would have said something. Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI
personnel approved of the abuse.” SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI
insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated:
“Loosen this guy up for us.” “Make sure he has a bad night.” “Make sure
he gets the treatment.” He claims these comments were made to CPL Granier
and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis stated that (sic): “the MI staffs to my
understanding have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has
been handling the MI holds. Example being statements like ‘Good job,
they’re breaking down real fast.’ ‘They answer every question.’ ‘They’re
giving out good information, Finally, and Keep up the good work’. Stuff like
that” (23).
“I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the finding found in MG
Ryder’s Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US
Government Agency’s (OGA’s) interrogators actively requested that MP guards
set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.
Contrary to the finding of MG Ryder’s Report, I find that personnel assigned to
the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility
22 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 25, March, 2004
23 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, pp. 18-19, March, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
9
procedures to “set the conditions” for MI interrogators. I find no direct evidence
that MP personnel actually participated in those MI interrogations” (24).
Prisoners of War, Terrorists, and Enemy Combatants
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon of September 11, 2001 heralded
a new era of foreign policy and promised to define the Bush presidency. The Bush
Administration initiated a proactive war against terrorism, resolving to “hunt down and
punish” the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and declared “those who are not with us are
against us.” The intensity of feeling generated by unprecedented terrorist attacks on
American soil, the scale of death and destruction, and the lawlessness of a stateless
enemy bred uncertainty about the rules of engagement. The need for intelligence, not just
to pursue the terrorists, but also to prevent further attacks on the U.S., brought pressure
on interrogators to produce results.
Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters captured in the ensuing war in Afghanistan and held at the
U.S. Navy base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were not afforded protections according to
the Geneva Convention. Al Qaeda was deemed not to be a nation, and “the Taliban lost
its right to prisoner of war status because it did not wear uniforms, did not operate under
responsible commanders, and systematically violated the laws of war” (25). The
proceduresfor treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, however, were reportedly
“consistentwith, but not pursuant to” the Geneva Convention. An April 2003 memo from
the Administration recommended to Donald Rumsfeld that he “approve a full range of 35
(interrogation) techniques. Nine were for exceptional use only, including slapping, sleep
deprivation, hooding, and use of dogs to induce fear” (26). Military lawyers expressed
concern about the basis of these recommendations and alarm that their civilian
counterparts within the Department of Defense were handing down recommendations
that placed obtaining information about terrorist activity as a first priority (27).
The same Administration memo also “warned Rumsfeld of a potential backlash if the
more aggressive techniques were used: If the treatment became public, it is likely to be
exaggerated or distorted in the U.S. and international media accounts, undermining
support for the war on terrorism. Moreover, U.S. officials could be subject to human
rights prosecutions abroad and the tactics could be used to justify mistreatment of
captured American soldiers. Two weeks later, Rumsfeld struck down 11 of the (35)
techniques recommended for his approval” (28).
24 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, pp. 18, March, 2004.
25 John C. Yoo, Law Professor UC Berkley, “Commentary; With ‘All Necessary and Appropriate Force’; In
interrogations, U.S. actions align with treaties and Congress’ wishes. Los Angels Times, Part B Page 13,
June 11, 2004.
26 Charlie Savage and Bryan Bender, “Policy Rift Seen on Detainees”, The Boston Globe, Page A1, June
24, 2004.
27 Charlie Savage and Bryan Bender, “Policy Rift Seen on Detainees”, The Boston Globe, Page A1, June
24, 2004.
28 Charlie Savage and Bryan Bender, “Policy Rift Seen on Detainees”, The Boston Globe, Page A1, June
24, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
10
A June 8, 2004 article in the Financial Times reported accusations that decisions and
policies set forth in a series of memos by officials in the Bush Administration had set a
precedent for abuse and torture.
“The administration of President George W. Bush was accused on
Tuesday by some members of Congress of sanctioning torture by preparing legal
analyses that said harsh treatment of detainees was permissible under U.S. and
international laws.
The charges come following the leak of memos from 2002 and 2003 in
which senior lawyers from the justice and defense departments had concluded that
torture might be legally permitted as part of the war on terrorism.
In heated exchanges before the Senate judiciary committee, the charges
were angrily denied by John Ashcroft, the US attorney-general, who endorsed the
arguments contained in the administration’s memos” (29).
According to Major General Taguba’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, none of the prisoners in Iraq were considered “terrorists.” U.S. troops,
however, were facing increasing attacks in the Fall of 2003, and commanders stepped up
efforts to question thousands of detainees held at Abu Ghraib, in an attempt to get to the
root of a growing insurgency (30). “In Iraq last fall, directives on treatment of prisoners
were changed at least three times in six weeks. Some of the procedures authorized in Iraq
had been banned as too harsh months earlier at Guantanamo” (31). Military lawyers later
complained that the “Pentagon was creating an atmosphere of ambiguity,” and that the
resulting abuses at Abu Ghraib were “not an accident” (32).
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 11, 2004, Senator Levin
questioned Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone:
Levin: “Secretary Cambone, in an article from last Saturday’s Post, in April 2003,
The Defense Department approved about 2