Rutgers University Coalition Building and Politics of Immigration Paper ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS
The issue of Immigration Reform has been simmering for many of the past presidential administrations. As we have seen during this past election cycle, the politics that drive this debate are both passionate and diverse. For this week’s assignment read the three attached articles and give your opinion whether your agree or disagree with Douglas Massey’s argument that “enforcement without legalization won’t work” Your second post should be a response to your group members opinion
Read:
1.Fine – Galbraith Final Paper
2.Massey: Backfire at the Border
3.Meissner: U.S. Temporary Worker Programs-Lessons Learned
Forum:
Give your opinion whether your agree or disagree with Douglas Massey’s argument that “enforcement without legalization won’t work” Your second post should be a response to your group members opinion.
Question 1: Explain why a border policy that relies solely on enforcement is bound to fail.
Question 2: What is the weakness in a blockade strategy?
FIRST POST (50 points)
Explain why a border policy that relies solely on enforcement is bound to fail [25 points]
Explain why a border policy that relies solely on enforcement is bound to fail 20
Use and cite external sources 5
What is the weakness in a blockade strategy [25 points]
Objective Possible Points Total Points
What is the weakness in a blockade strategy? 15
Explain why 5
Discuss the contributing factors 5
SECOND POST (50 points)
Objective Possible Points Total Points
Identifying your reaction (agreement, disagreement, etc.) 10
Focusing on a group member or members or the group as a whole 10
Providing a substantive response 10
Providing evidence or anecdotal evidence 10
Quality of the writing June 13, 2005
CIt!tLF. 1C=
MADE POLICY 5 7 .7′)I r_
Bac
re at the Border
Why Enforcement without Legalization
Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration
by Douglas S . Massey
Executive Summary
Despite increased enforcement at the
U .S .-Mexican border beginning in the
1980s, the number of foreign-born workers entering the United States illegally
each year has not diminished . Today an
estimated 10 million or more people
reside in the United States without legal
documentation .
For the past two decades, the U.S . government has pursued a contradictory policy on North American integration . While
the U.S. government has pursued more
commercial integration through the North
American Free Trade Agreement, it has
sought to unilaterally curb the flow of
labor across the U.S .-Mexican border.
That policy has not only failed to reduce
illegal immigration ; it has actually made
the problem worse
Increased border enforcement has only
succeeded in pushing immigration flows
into more remote regions . That has resulted in a tripling of the death rate at the border and, at the same time, a dramatic fall in
the rate of apprehension . As a result, the
cost to U.S. taxpayers of making one arrest
along the border increased from $300 in
1992 to $1,700 in 2002, an increase of 467
percent in just a decade .
Enforcement has driven up the cost of
crossing the border illegally, but that has had
the unintended consequence of encouraging
illegal immigrants to stay longer in the
United States to recoup the cost ofentry .The
result is that illegal immigrants are less likely
to return to their home country, causing an
increase in the number of illegal immigrants
remsmung in the United States Whatever
one thinks about the goal of reducing migration from Menace, US policies toward that
end have clearly failed, and at great cost to
U.S . taxpayers.
A border policy that relies solely on
enforcement is bound to fail . Congress should
build on President Bush’s immigration initiative to enact a temporary visa program that
would allow wodes from Canada, Mexico,
and other countries to work in the United
States without restriction for a certain limited
time . Undocumented workers already in the
United States who do not have a criminal
record should be given temporary , legal status .
andcoautY l rBeyond Smoke and (Mirror pMelxic Immigration in an tE ass
Economic Integration (New York . Russell Sage Foundation, 2002) .
of
INS!
No . 29
Despite increased
enforcement at the
U.S: Mexican border beginning in the
1980s, the number
of foreign-born
workers entering
the United States
illegally each
year has not
diminished.
Introduction
elected government of Mexican president
Vicente Fox .
By the summer of 2001, the discussions
were inching toward a consensus that involved
some kind of legalization program and a tem.’ The
porary work visa for Mexican citizens
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, pushed immigration reform and Mexico
to the back burner of administration concerns .
The inability of president Fox to negotiate a
labor accord with the United States undermined his political position domestically, led to
the early resignation of his foreign minister,
and contributed to electoral losses for his party
during the midterm elections of 2003 .
Meanwhile, the problems associated with
undocumented migration continued to fester
The Bush administration finally renamed to
the issue of immigration reform in 2004 . In a
January 7, 2004, speech at the White House,
the president proposed creating a large temporary worker program to legalize present undocumented migrants and accommodate new
entrants in the future . He would grant renewable three-year work visas to employers, which
would enable them to hire workers from
Mexico and other countries when suitable U.S .
workers could not be found Undocumented
migrants living in the United States would be
required to pay a one-time registration fee to be
eligible for the visa, but those who were still
abroad could register free of charge . The threeyear visa would be renewable, and, if in the
course of working in the United States a worker accumulated ties and characteristics that
qualified him or her for permanent residence,
he or she could apply for a green card conferring permanent resident status . Although the
supply of residence visas would be increased to
handle such applications, special credits and
incentives would be implemented to encourage
the return of temporary workers .’
The president’s proposal did not contain
specifics on the number of temporary worker
visas or new green cards to be authorized, but
his announcement set in motion a flurry of
alternative proposals for reform, including bills
introduced by Sens . McCain, Kennedy, Hagel,
Daschle, Craig, and Cornyn, as well as Reps .
One of the most important and challenging
problems facing the 109th Congress will be
immigration reform . Despite increased enforcement at the U.S .-Mexican border beginning in
the 1980s, the number of foreign-born workers
entering the United States illegally each year has
not diminished . Today an estimated 10 million
or more people reside in the United States without legal documentation, and that number continues to grow by 400,000 or more each years
In his State of the Union message on
February 2, 2005, President Bush challenged
Congress to fix the problem :
America’s immigration system is . . .
outdated, unsuited to the needs of our
economy and to the values of our
country. We should not be content
with laws that punish hardworking
people who want only to provide for
their families and deny businesses
willing workers and invite chaos at our
border. It is time for an immigration
policy that permits temporary guest
workers to fill jobs Americans will not
take, that rejects amnesty, that tells us
who is entering and leaving our country, and that closes the border to drug
dealers and terrorists .
The issue of immigration reform has been
simmering throughout the Bush presidency .
When the president first assumed office four
years ago, it was already clear to most observers
that U.S . immigration policy toward Mexico
was not working. Despite a massive buildup of
enforcement resources along the border,
Mexican immigration continued apace
throughout the 1990s, and the undocumented
population grew at an unprecedented rate,
enabling Hispanics to overtake African
Americans as the nation’s largest minority
much sooner than Census Bureau demographers had predicted? It was not surprising,
therefore, that early in its first term the Bush
administration began high-level talks on
immigration reform with officials in the newly
2
Pelosi, Cannon, Flake, Kolbe, and Gutierrez .°
Although none of those proposals made
progress in 2004, after the elections President
Bush restated his commitment to achieving
immigration reform in his second term .
To lay the groundwork for a reasoned consideration of policy options, this study
describes how the United States got into its
current predicament with respect to Mexican
immigration . It then outlines the sorts of polldes that that must be implemented if we are to
get out
Roots of the Current Problem
Paso, followed by Operation Gatekeeper in San
Diego. Those operations mobilized massive
resources, in two border sectors to prevent
undocumented border crossings e
Thereafter the United States pursued an
increasingly contradictory set of policies, rowing
toward integration while insisting on separation,
moving headlong toward the consolidation of all
North American markets save one: labor. In
order to maintain the pretense that such selective
integration could be achieved and to demonstrate that the border was “under control,” the
US . government devoted increasing financial
and human resources to a show of force along the
Mexico-US. border, a repressive impulse that
only increased in the wake of September 11 .
Unfortunately, those measures have not deterred
Mexicans from coming to die United States or
prevented them from settling her c .’
The year 1986 was pivotal for the political
economy of North America Two things happened in that year that signaled the end of one
era and the beginning of another . In Mexico, a
Moving toward Integration
new political elite succeeded in overcoming hisparty
to
The adoption of economic reforms in
torical opposition within the ruling
Mexico
in 1986 accelerated cross-border flows
secure the country’s entry into the General
.
of
all
sorts,
and those flows increased dramatiAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAFF)
Building on that initiative, President Carlos
cally after NAFTA took effect in 1994 .
Saunas approached the United States in 1988 to
Consider, for example, trends in total trade
make the economic reforms permanent by forg- between Mexico and the United States . From
1986 to 2003 total trade between the two
ing a continentwide alliance to create a free trade
nations increased by a factor of eight, reaching
zone stretching from Central America to the
.” Over the same period, the num$235 billion
Arctic, which ultimately resulted in the North
ber of Mexicans entering the United States on
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) .r
While trade liberalization took a step for- business visas more than tripled, from 128,000
to 438,000 annually, while the number of intraward in 1986, labor market mobility took a step
worked
with
company
transferees rose even more rapidly,
officials
.
Even
as
U.S
.
backward
integrate
North
from
4,300
to 16,000. From just 73 Mexican
authorities
to
Mexican
American markets for goods, capital, informa- “treaty investors” in 1986 the number grew
lion, raw materials, and services, they simulta- exponentially to 4,700 persons in 2003 . (Treaty
neously aced to prevent the integration of investors manage operations of an enterprise
Mexican and American labor markets . Rather within the United States in which they are an
active investor.) ”
than incorporating the movement of workers
This growth of trade and business migration
into the new free trade agreement, the US government sought to unilaterally restrict the was accompanied by an expansion of other
cross-border movements . Over the same period,
movement ofworkers .To underscore its resolve,
in 1986 Congress passed die Immigration the number of Mexican tourists entering the
Reform and Control Act, which criminalized United States increased six-fold to 3 .6 million,
the hiring of undocumented workers by U .S . while the number entering the United States as
employers and increased funding for the U .S . students doubled to 22,500, and the number of
educational and cultural exchange visitors more
Border PatroL Then, in 1993, Border Patrol
than
doubled, from about 3,000 to 6,600. 12 The
officials launched Operation Blockade in El
3
Even as U.S. officials worked with
Mexican authorities to integrate
North American
markets, they
simultaneously
acted to prevent
the integration of
Mexican and
American labor
markets.
total number of individual border crossings by
car, bus, vain, and on foot also grew rapidly, rising from 114 million in 1986 to more than 290
million in 2000 . Owing to the events of
September 11, 2001, and the US . economic
recession, the number of border crossings fell
between 2000 and 2002, but they were still 1 .7
times higher than their level in 1986?
Between 1986 and
1996, Congress and
the president
undertook a
remarkable series of
actions to reassure
citizens that they
were working hard
to “regain control”
of the U .S:
Mexican border.
Insisting on Separation
As the foregoing figures indicate, evidence
for the ongoing integration of the North
American economy is abundant, concrete, and
compelling. As envisioned by the proponents of
NAFTA, cross-border movements of people,
goods, and services have grown rapidly along a
variety of fronts . Although the United States has
committed itself to integrating most markets in
North America, however, it has paradoxically
sought to prevent the integration of its labor
markets . Indeed, since 1986 the United States
has embarked on a determined effort to restrict
Mexican immigration and tighten border
enforcement, an effort that intensified around
1994, just as NAFTA took effect.
During the 1980s, border control was framed
by U.S . politicians as an issue of”national security,” and illegal migration was portrayed as an
“alien invasion.” As a result, between 1986 and
1996, the Congress and the president undertook
a remarkable series of actions to reassure citizens
that they were working hard to “regain control”
M
of the US
.-Mexican border ‘Me arrival of the
new era was heralded by the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act in
October 1986.
As advocated by its proponents, IRCA
sought to combat undocumented migration in
four ways . To eliminate the attraction of U.S.
jobs, it imposed sanctions on employers who
hired undocumented workers . To deter undocumented migrants from entering the country, it
allocated additional resources to the Border
Patrol . To wipe the slate dean and begin afresh,
it authorized an amnesty for undocumented
migrants who could prove five years of continuous residence in the United States and a legalization program for migrant farm workers .
Finally, IRCA gave the president new authori-
ty to declare an “immigration emergency” if
large numbers of undocumented migrants had
embarked or were soon expected to embark for
the United States .”
Despite expectations that IRCA would
somehow, slow unsanctioned Mcdcan immigration, both legal and illegal migration from
Mexico still rose, and Congress returned to the
drawing board in 1990 to pass another revision
of U .S . immigration law. That legislation
focused strongly on border control and authorized funds for the hiring of additional Border
.”
officers
Patrol
Early in the Clinton adminisnation (1993-94), the Immigration and
Naturalization Service developed a new border
strategy that took full advantage of this
increased funding. Known as “prevention
through deterrence,” the strategy aimed to prevent Mexicans from crossing the border so that
they would not have to be deported later . The
strategy had its origins in September 1993,
when the Border Patrol chief in El Paso
launched “Operation Blockade”-an all-out
effort to prevent illegal border crossing within
that sector.” Within a few months, immigrants
had been induced to go around the imposing
wall of enforcement, and traffic through El Paso
itself was reduced to a trickle .”
Officials in Washington took note of the
favorable outcome in El Paso and incorporated
the operation into the Border Patrol’s national
strategic plan for 1994 . In October of that year,
a second border mobilization was authorized
for the busiest sector in San Diego . “Operation
Gatekeeper” installed high-intensity floodlights to illuminate the border day and night
and built an eight-foot steel fence along 14
miles of border from the Pacific Ocean to the
foothills of the Coastal Range . Border Patrol
officers were stationed every few hundred yards
behind this formidable steel wall, and a new
array of sophisticated hardware was deployed
in the no man’s land it ficed’a
This buildup of enforcement resources was
further accelerated by Congress when it passed
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 . Once again, the legislation focused heavily on deterrence, authorizing funds for the construction of two additional
layers of fencing in San Diego and enacting that posed no conceivable strategic threat to the
tougher penalties for smugglers, undocumented country and was, in fact, an ally and a large toadmigrants, and visitors who entered the country ing partner. Despite the fact that politicians sold
legally but then overstayed their visas. It also NAFTA as a ova, for Mexico “to export goods
and not people,” everything that occurs in the
included funding for the purchase of new milltary technology and provided funds for hiring course of integrating the North American market
1,000 Border Patrol agents per year through rakes the cross-border movement of people2001 to bring the total strength of the Border including workers-more rather than less likely
20
in the short and medium run . The expanding
Patrol up to 10,000 officers .
binational netunrk of transportation and comIn 1986 the budget of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service stood at just $474 mil- munication that evolves to facilitate trade also
lion, and that of the Border Patrol was $151
makes the movement of people easier and cheapmillion . IRCA began a modest acceleration of er. The interpersonal connections formed
between Mexicans and Americans in the course
funding for border enforcement, but it was the
innovation of border blockades in 1993 that of daily business transactions create a social infrareally opened the spigot of money. By 2002 the structure offiiendship and kinship that encourage
Border Patrol’s budget had reached $1 .6 billion
migration and facilitate further movement.
Moreover, it is not as if there were no moveand that of the INS stood at $6 .2 billion, 10
and 13 nines their 1986 values, respectively . meets of migrants across the border when
With this additional revenue, more Border NAFTA took effea . Large-scale migration
Patrol officers were hired . Between 1986 and from Mexico has been a fact of life in North
2002 the number of Border Patrol officers
America since 1942, when the United States
tripled, and the number of hours they spent
initiated the bracero guest worker program that
lasted 22 years .$° That program ultimately sponpatrolling the border (“linewatch hours”) grew
23
Bored the short-term entry of nearly five million
by a factor of about eight
workers, and when it was shut down in 1964,
movement continued through other channels .
The Consequences of
Thousands of former guest workers simply
Contradiction
adjusted status to acquire permanent resident
As the foregoing data clearly show, the 1990s visas, and a growing number migrated without
were a period of growing self-contradiction in documents . From 1942 to the present, the circuU. S. policy toward Mexico . On the one hand, lation of labor between Me,dco and the United
under NAFTA the United States committed States has been widespread and continuous . By
the end of the 20th century, two-thirds of all
itself to lowering barriers to the cross-border
movement of goods, capital, raw materials,
Mexicans knew someone who had been to the
information, and services . As a result, the vol- United States and almost 60 percent were
none ofbinationaltrade increased dramatically as socially connected to someone living in the
did cross-border movements of people . On the United States n
This huge stock of social capital connecting
other hand, the United States attempted to
harden the border against the movement of people in Mexico to destinations in the United
States, combined with the acceleration of ecolabor by criminalizing the hiring of undocumenred workers and fortifying the frontier with nomic integration along multiple fronts, premassive increases in money, personnel, and sents a huge obstacle for U.S. efforts to seal the
border selectively with respect to the moveequipment . By 2002 the Border Patrol was the
largest am s-bearing branch of the U .S govem- ment of workers .That the policy would fail was
almost preordained and should not be surprisment next to the military itself a’
ing to anyone who understands the nature of
Few in Washington stopped to consider the
markets and their integration over time and
fundamental contradiction involved in militarizing a long border with a friendly, peaceful nation
across international borders . What many do
5
Few in Washington
stopped to consider
the fundamental
contradiction
involved in militarizing a long border
with a friendly,
peaceful nation that
posed no conceivable strategic threat
to the country:
not realize, however, is that U .S . policies have
not simply failed: they have backfired-bringing about outcomes precisely opposi…
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